Ecology of zoonoses: natural and unnatural histories by Karesh, William B et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Public Health Resources Public Health Resources
12-2012
Ecology of zoonoses: natural and unnatural
histories
William B. Karesh
EcoHealth Alliance, karesh@ecohealthalliance.org
Andy Dobson
Princeton University
James O. Lloyd-Smith
University of California - Los Angeles
Juan Lubroth
Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
Matthew A. Dixon
Chatham House Centre on Global Health Security
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/publichealthresources
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Public Health Resources at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Health Resources by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Karesh, William B.; Dobson, Andy; Lloyd-Smith, James O.; Lubroth, Juan; Dixon, Matthew A.; Bennett, Malcolm; Aldrich, Stephen;
Harrington, Todd; Formenty, Pierre; Loh, Elizabeth H.; Machalaba, Catherine C.; Thomas, Mathew Jason; and Heymann, David L.,
"Ecology of zoonoses: natural and unnatural histories" (2012). Public Health Resources. 296.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/publichealthresources/296
Authors
William B. Karesh, Andy Dobson, James O. Lloyd-Smith, Juan Lubroth, Matthew A. Dixon, Malcolm Bennett,
Stephen Aldrich, Todd Harrington, Pierre Formenty, Elizabeth H. Loh, Catherine C. Machalaba, Mathew
Jason Thomas, and David L. Heymann
This article is available at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/
publichealthresources/296
Series
1936 www.thelancet.com   Vol 380   December 1, 2012
Zoonoses 1
Ecology of zoonoses: natural and unnatural histories
William B Karesh, Andy Dobson, James O Lloyd-Smith, Juan Lubroth, Matthew A Dixon, Malcolm Bennett, Stephen Aldrich, Todd Harrington, 
Pierre Formenty, Elizabeth H Loh, Catherine C Machalaba, Mathew Jason Thomas, David L Heymann
More than 60% of human infectious diseases are caused by pathogens shared with wild or domestic animals. 
Zoonotic disease organisms include those that are endemic in human populations or enzootic in animal 
populations with frequent cross-species transmission to people. Some of these diseases have only emerged 
recently. Together, these organisms are responsible for a substantial burden of disease, with endemic and enzootic 
zoonoses causing about a billion cases of illness in people and millions of deaths every year. Emerging zoonoses 
are a growing threat to global health and have caused hundreds of billions of US dollars of economic damage in 
the past 20 years. We aimed to review how zoonotic diseases result from natural pathogen ecology, and how other 
circumstances, such as animal production, extraction of natural resources, and antimicrobial application change 
the dynamics of disease exposure to human beings. In view of present anthropogenic trends, a more eff ective 
approach to zoonotic disease prevention and control will require a broad view of medicine that emphasises 
evidence-based decision making and integrates ecological and evolutionary principles of animal, human, and 
environmental factors. This broad view is essential for the successful development of policies and practices that 
reduce probability of future zoonotic emergence, targeted surveillance and strategic prevention, and engagement 
of partners outside the medical community to help improve health outcomes and reduce disease threats.
Introduction
Pathogens shared with wild or domestic animals 
cause more than 60% of infectious diseases in man.1 
Such pathogens and diseases include leptospirosis, cys-
ticer cosis and echinococcosis, toxoplasmosis, anthrax, 
brucellosis, rabies, Q fever, Chagas disease, type A 
infl uenzas, Rift Valley fever, severe acute respira tory 
syndrome (SARS), Ebola haemorrhagic fever, and the 
original emergence of HIV.2–6 Zoonotic diseases 
are often categorised according to their route of 
transmission (eg, vector-borne or foodborne), pathogen 
type (eg, micro parasites, macro parasites, viruses, bac-
teria, protozoa, worms, ticks, or fl eas), or degree of 
person-to-person transmissibility.7 The greatest burden 
on human health and livelihoods, amounting to about 
1 billion cases of illness and millions of deaths every 
year, is caused by endemic zoonoses that are persistent 
regional health problems around the world.2 Many of 
these infections are enzootic (ie, stably estab lished) in 
animal popu lations, and transmit from animals to 
people with little or no subsequent person-to-person 
transmission— for example, rabies or trypano somiasis. 
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Key messages
• Nearly two-thirds of human infectious diseases arise from pathogens shared with wild 
or domestic animals
• Endemic and enzootic zoonoses cause about a billion cases of illness in people and 
millions of deaths every year, and emerging zoonoses are a rising threat to global 
health, having caused hundreds of billions of US dollars of economic damage in the 
past 20 years
• Ecological and evolutionary perspectives can provide valuable insights into pathogen 
ecology and can inform zoonotic disease-control programmes
• Anthropogenic practices, such as changes in land use and extractive industry actions, 
animal production systems, and widespread antimicrobial applications aff ect zoonotic 
disease transmission
• Risks are not limited to low-income countries; as global trade and travel expands, 
zoonoses are increasingly posing health concerns for the global medical community
• Ecological, evolutionary, social, economic, and epidemiological mechanisms aff ecting 
zoonoses’ persistence and emergence are not well understood; such information 
could inform evidence-based policies, practices, and targeted zoonotic disease 
surveillance, and prevention and control eff orts
• Multisectoral collaboration, including clinicians, public health scientists, ecologists 
and disease ecologists, veterinarians, economists, and others is necessary for eff ective 
management of the causes and prevention of zoonotic diseases
Search strategy and selection criteria
We selected high-quality references that showed rigorous 
scientifi c methodologies in their research and analyses. We 
searched Web of Science for reviews and research articles 
published between Jan 1, 1990, and June 1, 2012, with the 
search terms “zoonotic disease” and “antimicrobial 
resistance”, and fi ltered results for “animals”, “wildlife”, or 
“wild animals”. We chiefl y selected publications from the past 
decade but did not exclude commonly referenced or highly 
regarded older publications. We also searched reference lists of 
articles identifi ed by this search and selected those we judged 
relevant. Review articles and book chapters are cited to 
provide readers with more details and more references. 
Non-peer-reviewed sources such as reports from the World 
Organization for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization, and WHO were also reviewed to provide direct 
information or additional supporting references. Additional 
references and materials were suggested by anonymous 
reviewers and additional reviewers invited by the authors.
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Other zoonotic pathogens can spread effi  ciently 
between people once introduced from an animal 
reservoir, leading to localised outbreaks (eg, Ebola 
virus) or global spread (eg, pan demic infl uenza). 
Zoonoses made up most of the emerging infectious 
diseases identifi ed in people in the past 70 years which, 
although relatively rare compared with endemic 
zoonoses, are a substantial threat to global health and 
have caused economic damage exceeding hundreds of 
billions of US dollars in the past 20 years.8,9 Apart from 
the appearance of a pathogen for the fi rst time in 
human beings, the distinction between endemic and 
emerging zoonoses can be viewed as temporal or 
geographical. An endemic disease in one location 
would be regarded as an emerging disease if it crossed 
from its natural reservoir and entered the human or 
animal populations in a new geographical area, or if an 
endemic pathogen evolved new traits that created an 
epidemic (eg, drug resistance).
Transmission of pathogens into human populations 
from other species is a natural product of our relation 
with animals and the environment. The emergence of 
zoonoses, both recent and historical, can be considered 
as a logical consequence of pathogen ecology and 
evolution, as microbes exploit new niches and adapt to 
new hosts. The underlying causes that create or provide 
access to these new niches seem to be mediated by 
human action in most cases, and include changes in 
land use, extraction of natural resources, animal pro-
duction systems, modern transportation, anti micro bial 
drug use, and global trade. Although under lying 
ecological principles that shape how these pathogens 
survive and change have remained similar, people have 
changed the environment in which these principles 
operate. Domestication of animals, clearing of land for 
farming and grazing, and hunting of wildlife in new 
habitats, have resulted in zoonotic human infection 
with microorganisms that cause diseases such as rabies, 
echino coccosis, and the progenitors of measles and 
smallpox that had historically aff ected only animal 
populations through changes in contact and increased 
transmission oppor tunities from animals to people.10–12 
As human societies have developed, each era of livestock 
revolution pre sented new health challenges and new 
opportunities for emergence of zoonotic pathogens.13
In the past few decades, accelerating global changes 
linked to an expanding global population have led to 
the emergence of a striking number of newly described 
zoonoses, including hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, 
monkeypox, SARS, and simian immunodefi ciency 
virus (the animal precursor to HIV). Some of these 
zoonoses, such as HIV, have become established as 
substantial new human pathogens that circulate 
persistently without repeat animal-to-person trans-
mission. SARS could have established, but was 
contained by rapid global response to its emergence;14 
other zoonoses, such as Ebola virus and Nipah virus, 
have not become established because of local control 
eff orts or their intrinsic inability to transmit effi  ciently 
between people. However, others such as hantavirus 
pulmonary syndrome, which is enzootic in rodents in 
many locations, cause sporadic and infrequent clusters 
of infections in human beings.15 In all cases, these 
emerging zoonoses are defi ned by their relatively recent 
appearance (or detection) in a population or, in some 
cases, an amplifi cation of transmission that increases 
the incidence, prevalence, or geographical dis tribution 
of previously rare pathogens.15
Emergence of a zoonosis depends on several factors 
that often act simultaneously to change pathogen 
dynamics. The capacity of a pathogen to transmit or 
spread in a population is commonly quantifi ed by the 
basic repro duction number, or R0 (panel 1). In addition to 
inherent properties of the pathogen, factors aff ecting 
emergence or spread include environmental factors or 
changes in land use, human population growth, changes 
to human behaviour or social structure, international 
travel or trade, microbial adaptation to drug or vaccine 
use or to new host species, and breakdown in public 
health infrastructure.17 With more than a billion inter-
national travellers every year, infected individuals could 
potentially spread zoonotic diseases anywhere in the 
world. Thus, with the emergence of new infectious 
diseases and the chronic presence of known zoonotic 
diseases in many low-income and middle-income coun-
tries that might or might not be adequately diagnosed or 
reported, zoonoses are increasingly relevant to the global 
medical community.
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Panel 1: Basic reproduction number (R0)
The ability of a pathogen to transmit in a population is 
commonly quantifi ed by the basic reproduction number 
(R0), which can be described mathematically. Formally, R0 is 
the average number of secondary cases an infected 
individual can cause in a specifi c population in which all 
individuals are susceptible. If R0 is greater than 1, the 
number of cases caused by a pathogen will increase and 
cause an epidemic. By contrast, when R0 is less than 1, the 
number of cases will diminish and the pathogen will 
eventually become extinct. For many pathogens, R0 is 
correlated with density of susceptible hosts (and contacts 
between them), thus one way that a new zoonosis can fail to 
become endemic in people is if the human population is 
sparse. This straightforward relation between population 
density and the ability of new zoonoses to colonise people 
might underpin the emergence of a series of endemic 
diseases thousands of years ago (eg, the Egyptian plagues, 
smallpox, and rubella), when populations aggregated into 
towns or cities and thus reached the density at which R0 for 
person-to-person transmission of pathogens introduced 
from animals exceeded 1, or could exceed 1 by evolving 
person-specifi c adaptations.16
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Ecology of zoonoses: why pathogens do what 
they do
Understanding infectious diseases beyond the scale of 
individual clinical cases requires assessment of eco-
logical and evolutionary perspectives. An epidemic is 
fundamentally an interaction between populations of 
two species, pathogen and host, and hence has formal 
similarities to predator–prey and other consumer–re-
source systems that ecologists have studied for decades. 
Multiyear cycles of immunising diseases such as 
measles have been understood by direct analogy to 
predator–prey cycles, and are driven by alternating 
periods of predator population growth (when prey are 
abundant) and decline (when prey are depleted).18 Simi-
larly, interactions between pathogen strains can be 
understood through assessment of principles of eco-
logical competition: one recent study19 explained the 
striking diversity of pneumococcal serotypes, and the 
epidemiological eff ect of the polyvalent conjugate vac-
cine, by interpretation of components of the acquired 
immune response in terms of stabilising and fi tness-
equalising ecological mechanisms. Such parallels are 
intrinsic and pervade all aspects of infectious disease—
even the central epidemiological concept of R0 is bor-
rowed from population ecology.20 Similarities apply to 
both macroparasites (helminths and arthropod ecto-
parasites) and microparasites (viruses, bacteria, and 
protozoa). One diff erence is that microparasites have 
short generation times and can be subject to strong 
selection pressures from host immunity, other organ-
isms present in the microbiome, and antimicrobial 
drugs, all of which are key potential components of the 
ecosystem in which the microbes live. As a result, 
pathogen evolution can occur in very short time-
scales;21,22 signifi cant evolutionary changes can occur in 
the course of one epidemic or even during individual 
infections. A conspicuous example is the development 
of resistance in bacteria in response to antimicrobial 
therapy and, in a slightly longer timescale, the antigenic 
change in infl uenza viruses that results in the need 
for frequent updating of the infl uenza vaccine 
formulation.23
The dynamics of zoonotic disease transmission are 
deeply embedded in the ecology and evolutionary 
biology of their hosts. A zoonosis comprises interaction 
between at least three species: one pathogen and two 
host species, with people and another animal species 
acting as the reservoir of the infection. For vector-borne 
zoonoses,24 the ecology is complicated because the 
ecology of numerous other vector and reservoir host 
species can change transmission dynamics.24 Directly 
transmitted zoonoses can also have several reservoir 
hosts, potentially serving diff erent roles in pathogen 
dynamics, such as amplifi  cation or transmission to 
human beings.25 For example, the zoonotic para-
myxovirus Nipah virus has fruit bat reservoir hosts in 
Malaysia. The virus became established in domestic pig 
populations, amplifying viral trans mission and leading 
to a large outbreak in human beings in 1998–99.26 More 
than 100 people died during this outbreak and more 
than 1 million pigs were killed to control the disease.
Changes in abundance of animal hosts can strikingly 
aff ect disease incidence in people. A decrease in the 
abundance of a preferred animal host can cause an 
arthropod vector to shift feeding patterns to human 
beings, leading to a disease outbreak. For example, 
when rinderpest was fi rst introduced to east Africa, 
cattle and wildebeest populations depleted rapidly and 
tsetse fl ies switched to feeding on people, causing a 
large epidemic of sleeping sickness.27 Environmental 
changes (including anthropogenic eff ects) might 
change the abundance of a wildlife reservoir host, 
increasing transmission within the reservoir and the 
risk of zoonotic transmission. El Niño events in 
1991–92 and 1997–98 led to human hantavirus cases in 
the southwestern USA via an ecological cascade: 
increased precipitation caused vege tation growth, 
allow ing rodent densities to rise, allowing an increase 
in hantavirus infections in rodents. This increase did 
not cause population declines in rodents because, like 
many wildlife reservoirs of zoonotic patho gens, hanta-
virus causes mild or subclinical infections in this 
group. However, the increased prevalence in rodents 
increased the risk of infection in people.28
Ecological principles also apply at the scale of indi-
viduals. Infected hosts contain a population of patho gens 
that grows and evolves according to the same principles 
as a free-living plant or animal popu lation. Processes of 
viral replication, immune clearance, and tissue tropism 
can be understood by analogy to ecological processes of 
reproduction, mortality, and dispersal between habi-
tats.29,30 The microbial ecology of zoonotic pathogens 
within their reservoir hosts can be a key determinant of 
risk to human health. For example, feeding diff erent 
diets to beef cattle before slaughter leads to diff erent 
environmental conditions within the gut, and a shift in 
the balance of competition among microbial species, 
which can change the abundance of human pathogens 
such as Escherichia coli O157:H7.31 The ecological prin-
ciple of competitive exclusion is the basis for common 
approaches to control of zoonotic pathogens in livestock 
and poultry.32,33
Meta-genomic studies show that the community of 
commensal bacteria within healthy hosts plays an im-
portant part in defence against pathogens.34 Further-
more, disruption of this community through changes 
in diet or use of antimicrobials can allow the growth of 
other organisms, some of which might be pathogenic. 
This mechanism underlies diff erential susceptibility to 
Clostridium diffi  cile infection and might also increase 
the risk of zoonotic infections (as reported for sal-
monella).35,36 This factor underscores the importance of 
study of the full microbial community within hosts 
(microbiome), and not just pathogens.34
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Zoonotic disease risk and global demand for food
Increasing demand for food due to an expanding 
global population has led to a substantial susceptibility 
of our populations to food-borne zoonoses.37 Patho gens 
in the livestock production chain are a particular 
risk, with repeated outbreaks from meat, eggs, milk, 
and cheese, or meat byproducts incorporated into 
foods as fl avouring, oils, or stock.38 Globally, most 
types of domesticated and wild vertebrates and 
many invertebrates are foods for people; such foods are 
capable of harbouring zoonotic bacteria, viruses, or 
parasites.38
Knowledge of the ecology of many foodborne patho-
gens and their range of hosts is poor. When disease 
outbreaks occur in people, the animal source is often 
diffi  cult to identify, restricting epidemiological investi-
gation and ecological understanding. As for many 
zoonoses, foodborne pathogens often cause mild or 
subclinical disease in reservoir hosts, and because 
surveillance systems for wildlife and domestic animals 
are not universally adequate for detection of clinical 
disease or pathogen presence, humans beings often act 
as sentinel populations for zoonoses.39
The volume of consumption of wildlife products for 
food is at least an order of magnitude lower than it is 
for domestic livestock.40 However, human being–animal 
contact associated with hunting, preparation, and 
consumption of wild animals has led to transmission of 
notable diseases. Such diseases include HIV/AIDS, 
which was linked to the butchering of hunted chimpan-
zees,41 SARS, which emerged in wildlife market and 
restaurant workers in southern China,42 and Ebola 
haemorrhagic fever linked to the hunting or handling 
of infected great apes or other wild animals.43 All these 
disease transmissions are examples of organ isms or 
pathogens exploiting new host opportunities resulting 
from human behaviour. For central African countries 
alone, estimates of annual wild meat consumption total 
1 billion kg.4 Solutions to increased demand for bush-
meat are not straightforward, and although substitution 
of protein from domestic animal production might 
seem logical, increased livestock production in develop-
ing countries without adequate disease-manage ment 
practices might lead to the emergence of other patho-
gens due to the introduction of new hosts.
Many foodborne zoonoses are enzootic in livestock 
(eg, bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis, salmonellosis, and 
some helminth infections), especially in low-income 
and middle-income countries, and result in endemic 
infec tions and outbreaks of disease in people. Cultural 
and farming practices such as stocking rates, mixing of 
species, methods of confi nement, and feeding, and lack 
of proper implementation of disease-control methods—
because of weak veterinary infrastructures and in suf-
fi cient public–private partnerships to support and 
strengthen them—can serve to maintain or spread 
zoonotic diseases in livestock and provide a source of 
new infections in susceptible human populations 
(panel 2).45,46 The tech niques with which animals are 
slaughtered and processed, and how products are 
stored, packed, transported, and prepared at the place 
they are consumed, also enable foodborne disease 
outbreaks.37 Outbreaks of trichinosis in people are often 
linked to the consumption of incompletely cooked meat 
from pigs and wild boars and, occasionally, wild game.37 
Cysticercosis (caused by the pig tapeworm Taenia 
solium) aff ects 50 million people every year.2 
Echinococcosis (caused by the larval stages of the dog 
tapeworm Echinococcus granulosus for which ungulates 
serve as the intermediate host) aff ects 200 000 people 
every year, resulting in relative economic impacts 
equivalent to US$4·1 billion annually for treatment and 
control in humans and animals.6 Other notable 
foodborne parasites include trematodes (liver, lung, 
and intestinal fl ukes), which are a neglected disease 
group despite contributing to a sub stantial disease 
burden in southeast Asia and posing a serious 
impediment to public health and economic prosperity 
in the region.47
Panel 2: Emergence of highly pathogenic avian 
infl uenza A H5N1
Although smallholder herds and fl ocks remain important for 
the livelihoods and food security of millions of people, 
intensifi cation of livestock production is rapidly occurring 
worldwide. This process has inherent advantages in terms of 
increased productivity, economies of scale, ease and 
effi  ciency of surveillance, and application of herd health. 
However, ecological risks of intensifi ed production 
(eg, increased host density and contact rates, reduction of 
genetic diversity within populations, and selection of 
genetic stock for improved feed conversion rather than 
disease resistance) without eff ective disease-control 
practices, were shown by the emergence of highly 
pathogenic avian infl uenza A H5N1. This form of avian 
infl uenza evolved from a less virulent strain in domestic 
poultry to become very virulent, probably as a result of 
increased mixing between fl ocks and species in an 
environment where biosecurity improvements have not 
kept pace with the rate of livestock intensifi cation.44 The 
organism expanded its geographical range through various 
movement and marketing practices, contamination of 
inanimate objects and environments, and in some cases 
transmission back to migratory birds.44 More than 579 cases 
of H5N1 infl uenza in people have been reported globally, 
resulting in 341 deaths, and more than 230 million birds 
have been killed by the disease or culled in counter-epizootic 
measures. However, the virus continues to circulate in avian 
populations. More eff ective control of this disease in 
poultry, such as improved surveillance, prevention, and 
response programmes, could have prevented cases of 
disease in people and protected livelihoods.
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Land-use change, extractive industries, and 
zoonoses
Many zoonoses can be linked to large-scale changes in 
land use that aff ect biodiversity and relations between 
animal hosts, people, and pathogens. Land modifi cation, 
irrespective of reason, changes vegetation patterns, 
vector and host species dynamics (eg, abundance, 
distri bution, and demographics), microclimates, and 
human contact with domestic and wild animals. All 
these factors are crucial in disease ecology. The eff ects 
have been well studied and described for vector-borne 
diseases such as malaria and Lyme disease.48 In 
northeastern USA, a historical cycle of deforestation, 
reforestation, and habitat fragmentation changed 
predator–prey popu lations and led to the emergence of 
Lyme disease.24 Prevalence of human alveolar echino-
coccosis (caused by Echinococcus multilocularis, a 
tapeworm of wild and domestic canids, with small 
mammals serving as inter mediate hosts) in Tibet is 
correlated with overgrazing and degradation of pastures 
and the resulting increase in small mammal densities.49
In tropical regions, changes in land use have been 
linked to the occurrence of Chagas disease,50 yellow 
fever,51 and leishmaniasis.51 Such changes are par-
ticularly intense in tropical regions where primary 
forest is opened up to mining, logging, plantation 
devel opment, and oil and gas extraction. This deforest-
ation poses a threat to global health because many of 
these regions are emerging disease hotspots—rich in 
wildlife biodiversity and probably rich in the diversity 
of microbes, many of which have not yet been 
encountered by people.8 Increased access to tropical 
forests for these extractive industries might increase 
the risk of zoonotic disease by changing habitat and 
vector community com position, modifying the distri-
bution of wildlife popu lations and domestic animals, 
and increasing exposure to pathogens through 
increased human contact with animals.48,50
Human contact with wildlife is increased on a large 
scale through road building, establishment of settle-
ments, and increased mobility of people, and the 
extractive process itself.51 Where these changes take 
place, hunting, consumption, and trade in wildlife for 
food often increases.4,52 If sites are poorly managed, 
increased populations can strain existing infrastructure, 
leading to overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions, im-
proper disposal of waste, and a lack of potable water.53 
All of these changes increase the risk of cross-species 
trans mission of pathogens, resulting in zoonotic 
disease. Additionally, new human inhabitants (recent 
immi grants) might not have immunity to zoonotic 
diseases endemic to the area, making them particularly 
sus ceptible to infection.
Extractive industry companies often have to do assess-
ments of the environmental and social eff ect of their 
processes. However, assessments of the health eff ect 
that include principles of disease ecology are rarely 
done because standard operating procedures in devel-
op ing countries and specifi c laws or regulations often 
do not require an assessment for health risks at a 
community level.54 Furthermore, although some guide-
lines include zoonotic disease from domestic animals 
in their intended scope, few adequately address the 
range of potential zoonotic pathogens.
Antimicrobial drug resistance and zoonoses
Antimicrobial resistance is an important clinical 
problem in veterinary and human medicine. Better 
regulation of antimicrobial use in animals and more 
judicious use by human beings is needed than exists at 
present.55 Use of antibiotics is the most direct 
mechanism for the evolution of antimicrobial-resistant 
infectious diseases in people. However, because many 
organisms carried by livestock are zoonotic and the 
transmission of drug-resistant genetic material between 
bacterial populations by phages can occur by other 
means, the widespread use of antimicrobial drugs for 
prophylaxis and as growth promoters in livestock 
production has led to worries about a possible route for 
the emergence of antibiotic resistance in people.56
From an ecological perspective, antimicrobial resist-
ance is a natural occurrence; genes conferring resis-
tance probably originated as an evolutionary response 
to antimicrobial drugs produced by free-living bacteria, 
fungi, and plants to protect themselves from infection 
or competition (panel 3).63,64 The early antibiotics used 
in human medicine were all derived from natural 
bacterial and fungal sources. In turn, the use of these 
compounds would have resulted in selection for 
resistance in bacteria, and horizontal transfer via 
transposons and plasmids allowed these genes to 
spread rapidly through microbial populations and 
communities. Resistance is emerging today on the 
same evolutionary principles. Microbial populations 
are adapting subject to the same forces of competition 
and selection, but the current widespread use of 
antimicrobial agents in people far exceeds that of any 
time since their development as drugs.
Increased intensifi cation of livestock production 
during the 20th century led to problems with infectious 
diseases that transmitted easily in dense host 
populations. In response, agricultural industries intro-
duced a range of antimicrobial drugs because of their 
prophylactic qualities.65 Some of these antibiotics are 
also used extensively in animal feed, to enhance growth 
rates, improve feeding effi  ciency, and decrease waste 
pro duction of animals.66 Whether or not the use of 
antibiotics in agriculture has exacerbated drug resis-
tance in people has been debated widely.67 Farmworkers 
exposed occu pationally to antibiotics have an increased 
prevalence of resistant gut bacteria, and resistant patho-
gens of relevance to human medicine—including 
meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus—have been 
identifi ed in farm animals, although the transfer of 
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these bacteria from people to farm animals is also a 
plausible explanation.56,68 Several pathways exist 
through which antimicrobial-resistant zoonotic patho-
gens could be transmitted from livestock to people, 
including through food consumption, direct contact 
with treated animals, waste management, use of 
manure as fertiliser, faecal contamination of run-off , 
movement of fomites through water and wind, and 
translocation or migration of animals.63,69,70 Moreover, 
30–90% of veter inary anti biotics are excreted after 
administration to livestock, mostly in unmetabolised 
form, presenting a direct route for environmental 
contamination.56,69
Although known to occur, the extent of transfer of 
antimicrobial-resistant organisms from animals to 
people is unclear.56 Reduction of the use of antimicrobial 
drugs in animals might not be a complete solution, 
because diversity in antimicrobial resistance in people 
is unlikely to be always related to geographical overlap 
with livestock.71 Furthermore, the potential for reversal 
of resistance is unknown, as is whether it would occur 
in clinical settings after a change in antimicrobial use. 
Substantial reductions in levels of resistant strains have 
been shown after termination of drug use,67 although 
persistence has been noted.72 Thus, reversion to drug 
susceptibility probably depends on occurrence of 
natural dilution of microbial populations with 
susceptible strains and fi tness costs of resistance.72
Perspectives
The continuing eff ect of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is a 
reminder of the risk of zoonotic pathogens spreading 
from their natural reservoirs to man. What is far less 
broadly appreciated is that none of the approaches 
commonly used to search for potential new human 
pathogens—such as tracing back the source host of a 
human disease—probably would have identifi ed 
simian immunodefi ciency virus as a potential risk to 
man. Thus, bold new approaches are needed.73 
According to estimates from the UN, the global popu-
lation will be more than 9 billion by 2050, and more 
than half the global population already lives in urban 
areas. Changes to food production systems provide 
more food security for growing populations, but also 
change zoonotic disease risks in ways that challenge 
disease control. The eff ect of endemic zoonotic diseases 
results in an annually recurring burden to the health 
and livelihoods of people worldwide, but dispropor-
tionately burdens low-income and middle-income 
countries.2,5 Costs of zoonotic diseases are not restricted 
to expenses of human or animal treatment and control 
eff orts. The disruptions to commerce and society 
caused by disease outbreaks can account for a large 
share (and in some cases almost all) of the economic 
costs from disease. For example, SARS cost an 
estimated $30–50 billion despite causing illness in 
fewer than 9000 people.9
Understanding the ecology of zoonotic diseases at 
the human being–animal interface is a complex 
challenge. It requires knowledge of animal and human 
medicine, ecology, sociology, microbial ecology, and 
evolution, and the underlying issues that drive 
increased trans mission of pathogens in humans, 
wildlife, and live stock: an idea described as a One 
Health perspective.13,40 Meeting the challenge will also 
require an under standing of how the environment is 
changing, and how these changes aff ect microbial 
dynamics across the system. Therefore, pre vention and 
Panel 3: Ecology of antimicrobial resistance
Antimicrobial-resistant bacteria occur in many wild mammals 
and birds in numerous geographical locations.57–59 Although 
such bacteria are expected to exist wherever they are exposed 
to antimicrobials naturally produced by bacteria, fungi, or 
plants, resistance noted in wildlife can also be a result of either 
transmission of resistant organisms from domestic animals or 
people, or anthropogenic contamination of the environment 
with antimicrobials or their metabolites. Analysis of genes 
conferring antimicrobial resistance from bacteria found in 
non-human primates, people, and livestock shows that 
resistant bacteria from non-human primates that live close to 
people and livestock are genetically more similar than are 
bacteria found in non-human primates from areas with little or 
no geographical overlap with people and livestock.60 The study 
also shows the natural occurrence of antimicrobial-resistant 
organisms and similarities in resistance patterns where wildlife, 
livestock, and people are in contact.
Studies of antimicrobial resistance in faecal Escherichia coli 
from rodents on pig and poultry farms in the UK suggested 
that resistance patterns, and the genes encoding resistance, 
are much the same in both wildlife and livestock (Bennett M, 
unpublished). Another study showed diff erent patterns of 
resistance in E coli in bank voles (Myodes glareolus), wood mice 
(Apodemus sylvaticus), and cattle on dairy farms in the UK.61 
Moreover, prevalence of vancomycin resistance in E coli 
between these two rodent species changes throughout the 
year.61,62 This fi nding suggests that, whatever the original 
sources of resistant bacteria and genes, diff erences in the 
ecology of wildlife species (eg, their diet and physiology) 
produce selection pressure on the microbes, rather than 
diff erential exposure to anthropogenic antimicrobials or 
presence of diff erent resistant strains in the environment.
The dynamics of antimicrobial resistance in wildlife, both 
naturally occurring and arising from anthropogenic 
infl uences, are not well established. Long-term multicentre 
studies could provide an improved understanding of natural 
variation, changes with time, and interspecies transfer. In 
addition to observational studies, experimental work with 
wildlife could provide valuable insights to understanding of 
population and community eff ects of antimicrobial use and 
persistence of changes.
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response to zoonotic diseases and elimin ation or 
mitigation of transmission routes to prevent their 
emergence will need multi sectoral collaboration.5,40 
Because zoonoses aff ect developed and developing 
countries alike, and spread readily across national 
boundaries, mitigation and control needs collaboration 
between ministries of health, environment and agri-
culture, and inter governmental agencies involved in 
health, trade, food production, and the environment. 
Inter national disease-prevention eff orts will be 
enhanced by the implementation of WHO’s 
International Health Regulations, which allow for 
reporting of a broad range of human disease events, 
and through support of imple mentation of international 
standards for animal health and zoonoses produced by 
the World Organ ization for Animal Health, which 
includes reporting obligations for animal diseases 
including zoonoses. The need for improved veterinary 
services in many low-income and middle-income 
countries is implied by the gap in broad awareness of 
zoonotic diseases and their ability for detection and 
prevention in animals, and the ability to quantify and 
report their occurrences. Because disruptive eff ects to 
commerce and society can account for a large share of 
the economic costs of disease, integration of control 
strategies in animals into zoonotic disease control 
eff orts might prove more cost eff ective than would 
control in people alone.74
Recent advances in understanding of patterns of zoo-
notic disease emergence and spread have begun to be 
integrated into human infectious-disease-control pro-
grammes, although substantial progress needs to be 
made.75 Enhancing the role ecologists play in control 
programmes could include production of more accurate 
mathematical model outputs by collaboration with 
clinicians with real-time data, participation in both 
prospective and retrospective study design, and fi eld 
studies to identify key risk factors to target surveillance 
and interventions.7 Collaboration between public health 
scientists, who normally use epidemiological tech-
niques with human case data, and disease ecologists 
who often work with wildlife or livestock data to model 
risk in human beings, should be encouraged. These 
disease ecology approaches might be particularly useful 
in driving advances in prediction of the emergence and 
spread of novel zoonoses.73 Understanding of the rela-
tion between environmental changes, wildlife popu-
lation dynamics, and the dynamics of their microbes 
can be used to forecast risk of human infection with 
enzootic or endemic zoonoses (fi gure). All zoonoses 
have non-human reservoir hosts, and the dynamics 
of the pathogen in these hosts often determines the risk 
of outbreaks in people. This risk can vary with geo-
graphy, seasons, or through multiyear cycles, and can 
depend on factors such as changes in land use, weather, 
climate, or environment. Investigations into the 
dynamics of zoo notic pathogens in their wildlife reser-
voir could act as an early warning system to better 
inform the risk of an outbreak in livestock or people, 
and reduce the number of cases of human disease. For 
example, satellite tracking of vegetation density corre-
lates with breeding sites for the vector of Rift Valley 
fever, and has been used to successfully forecast cases of 
disease in human beings, and the necessity for vaccine 
supply.76 These approaches can be developed further to 
ultimately predict the risk of future disease emergence.73
Study of the ecological, evolutionary, social, economic, 
and epidemiological mechanisms that facilitate the 
persistence of common endemic zoonoses and those 
that drive zoonotic disease emergence in people has 
Figure: Clinical relevance of disease ecology
(A) Transmission of infection and amplifi cation in people (bright red) occurs after a pathogen from wild animals (pink) 
moves into livestock to cause an outbreak (light green) that amplifi es the capacity for pathogen transmission to 
people. (B) Early detection and control eff orts reduce disease incidence in people (light blue) and animals (dark green). 
Spillover arrows shows cross-species transmission.  
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intrinsic value. Although studies of common endemic 
zoonoses are often underfunded and regarded as neg-
lected tropical diseases, studies of zoonotic disease 
emergence are challenged because they are often 
intensive, retro spective, and sometimes expensive 
(eg, studies to understand the cause of Nipah virus 
emer gence or wildlife reservoirs of Ebola virus). Further-
more, emerging zoonotic disease studies are often 
considered as animal-focused or academic research 
(eg, studies to understand how dynamics of a pathogen 
in a wildlife host can change seasonally), when they are 
actually translational research eff orts essential to guide 
clinical or public health interventions (eg, seasonal vari-
ation in dynamics drives variation in risk to people).
The complex ecology of antimicrobial resistance and 
foodborne zoonoses suggests new avenues for research, 
including an understanding of the microbiome from 
people and that of the animals they contact, and what 
causes zoonotic microbes to proliferate in some 
conditions. Eff ects of the use of antibiotics in animal 
production are not well understood, and the translation 
of this science could be enhanced by involvement of 
physicians, veterinarians, and ecologists in the design 
and interpretation of studies. Standardised data col-
lection and long-term monitoring are needed, as are 
risk assessments for development of multidrug resis-
tance or multibacterial infections in human beings 
resulting from antimicrobial use in food animals and 
from wild life.63,67,69 Exploration of alternatives such as 
probiotics, diets to promote healthy or protective gastro-
intestinal fl ora, new methods of immune-system modu-
lation, bacteriophages, bacterial cell wall hydro lases, 
and anti microbial peptides is warranted to help reduce 
the need for antimicrobial use in people and animals.56,77
Industries based on the extraction of natural resources 
provide materials and economic incentives, but might 
lead to the release of pathogens that are new to human 
hosts. Guidelines for safe or best practices that include 
ecological knowledge to reduce the risk of disease 
emergence or occurrence are urgently needed. Such 
guidelines ought to be mandated through the funding 
mechanisms that support large-scale development 
projects or be required by fi nancial insurers.
Wide gaps in public health, veterinary and medical 
infrastructure, and training exist between developed 
and developing countries. These gaps aff ect disease 
prevention, surveillance, and control. Furthermore, 
little integration of ecological approaches in zoonotic 
disease prevention and control eff orts has occurred in 
most countries. These challenges need to be addressed 
urgently, and the One Health approach perhaps 
provides a wider, holistic view with which to achieve 
this aim. Although the causes and risks of zoonoses 
vary widely from one region or culture to the next, our 
global connectivity demands the attention and alertness 
of health professionals everywhere. That human 
activities are a driving force for where and how 
zoonoses occur not only means that improved health-
care systems are needed, but also that multisectoral, 
policy-level approaches should be instigated to decrease 
the burden of endemic zoonoses and prevent emer-
gence of new ones.
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